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THE FLORIDA ELECTION CAMPAIGN FINANCING ACT:
A BOLD APPROACH TO PUBLIC FINANCING OF
ELECTIONS
CHRIS HAUGHEE*
Florida's explosive population growth and the changing ways
of life in this urban state have created problems in the political
process just as troubling as the substantive problems of the envi-
ronment, social services, and criminal justice. After all, these
substantive issues can only be addressed by consensus solutions
if the political process itself has integrity. In this Article, the
author reviews the history of modern campaign reforms in Flor-
ida and other jurisdictions, then examines the new system for
public financing of statewide elections in Florida. He concludes
that, despite the good intentions of the legislature, the utimate
success or failure of the program will depend upon its accept-
ance by all players in the electoral process.
If you watch Florida politics, the wealthy are taking over.'
W HILE there is no minimum financial status required for a
person to run for statewide elected office, it should not sur-
prise even a casual observer of Florida's political scene that the
Governor and most of the present Cabinet members are wealthy
people.2 Our political system increasingly has become the domain
of the rich and famous, 3 and the high cost of campaigning is one
* Staff Director, House Committee on Ethics and Elections, Florida Legislature. B.A.,
1973, J.D., 1977, Florida State University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the staff of the House Committee on
Ethics and Elections in the preparation of this Article: Pat Campbell, Committee Secretary;
Sarah Bradshaw, Legislative Analyst; Jane Tillman, Legislative Analyst.
1. House Speaker advocates public financing for political campaigns, St. Petersburg
Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at 2B, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Speaker advocates public
financing].
2. According to financial disclosure reports filed with the Secretary of State, the net
worth of the Governor and Cabinet members is: Gov. Bob Graham, $8.16 million; Att'y Gen.
Jim Smith, $9.69 million; Secretary of State George Firestone, $1.3 million; Comm'r of
Educ. Ralph Turlington, $939,992; Treasurer Bill Gunter, $911,416; Agriculture Comm'r
Doyle Conner, $780,212; Comptroller Gerald Lewis, $140,706.
3. There is a widely held perception that the electoral process is increasingly restricted
to wealthy candidates. "I think what we are talking about is a system that is only. going to
provide an opportunity for the rich to pursue public office and I think that that is contrary
to everything we believe in." Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ethics & Elect. (unpaginated partial tran-
script) (Feb. 6, 1985) (on file with committee) (statement of Secretary of State Firestone).
"We are rapidly approaching the time when only the rich or those with access to great
individual or interest group wealth can afford to compete." Study of the American Electo-
rate, 1985: Hearings on S. 1310 Before the Senate Comm. on Com., Science, and Transp.,
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reason why.' This high cost has bred a host of distasteful and
shady campaign practices and spurred rampant growth of political
action committees (PACs). Many people, in and out of politics, are
questioning the system. One United States senator summed up the
concern: "[We] in this country should begin asking the question, is
the present state of political campaigns what we want in America?
Is this what we deserve from the democratic process or has some-
thing gone terribly wrong?" 5
At the urging of Speaker James Harold Thompson," the Florida
Legislature passed the Florida Election Campaign Financing Act
(FECFA) in 1986.7 The Act offers state funds to gubernatorial and
Cabinet office candidates who agree to certain condi-
tions-including a limit on campaign spending. In this Article, the
author reviews the provisions of the FECFA, places it in historical
context, and considers its future.'
I. REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCING
Modern initiatives to reform campaign practices began in 1972,
not coincidentally, the year of Watergate and other election abuses
that were blamed on the influence of money. The principal reform
measures adopted involved more thorough public reporting of cam-
paign finances and public financing.
A. Other Jurisdictions
Beginning in Washington State in 1972, a wave of campaign fi-
nance reform swept the nation, picking up momentum in the post-
Watergate years. Most legislative reforms focused on disclosure re-
quirements for campaign contributions,9 but public financing pro-
visions also proved popular. Within five years, at least fourteen
states had adopted legislation providing state funds for election
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (Sept. 10, 1985) (statement of Curtis B. Gans, Director, Comm. for
the Study of the American Electorate) [hereinafter cited as U.S: Senate Hearings].
4. According to Curtis Gans, "In constant dollars, the cost of campaigning has tripled
since 1960, doubled since 1972." U.S. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 28.
5. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Danforth).
6. Dem., Gretna, 1974-1986.
7. Ch. 86-276, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 106.30-36).
8. This Article does not include extensive discussion of the policy arguments for and
against public financing of campaigns or the empirical basis for the legislation. For a more
thorough examination of these areas, see generally Moore & La Belle, Public Financing of
Elections: New Proposals to Meet New Obstacles, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 863, 865 n.12 (1985).
9. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 17-22-9 (1975); South Carolina: S.C. CODE § 8-13-620
(1976); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-14-8 (1984); Wyoming: WYO. STAT. § 22-25-106 (1977).
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campaigns. 1° Currently, twenty-three states and the District of Co-
lumbia offer some form of assistance for campaign financing.11
Four states provide only tax incentives to campaign contributors.
12
Eleven states provide funds to political parties which, in some
cases, may support general election candidates. 3 Eight states dis-
tribute funds directly to candidates 4 for various positions ranging
from governor to a local office, including judgeships. 5
10. Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 34-2503 (Supp. 1986); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.21, .23
(West Supp. 1986); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. § 121.230 (Supp. 1986); Maine: ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5283 (Supp. 1986); Maryland: MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 31-3(a) (1974);
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 55A (West Supp. 1986); Michigan: MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 169.212 (Supp. 1986); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.30 (West Supp.
1986); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-304 (1985); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §
19:44A-27 (West Supp. 1986); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-159.1 (Supp. 1985);
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-30-2(a) (Supp. 1985); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14A-
100(1), (2) (1984); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11.50(1),(2) (West Supp. 1986).
11. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 40-18-146(c) (1975); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.130
(1985); Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-901 (1985); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-
1109 (1983); California: CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 18701 (West Supp. 1986); District of
Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1401 (Supp. 1986); Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 11-217
(Supp. 1984); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 34-2503 (Supp. 1986); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 9-7-
5.5-8(a) (Burns 1971); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.21, .23 (West Supp. 1986); Kentucky:
Ky. REV. STAT. § 121.230 (Supp. 1986); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5283 (Supp.
1986); Maryland: MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 31-3(a) (1974); Massachusetts: MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 55A (West Supp. 1986); Michigan: MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 169.212 (Supp.
1986); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.30 (West Supp. 1986); Montana: MONT. CODE
ANN. § 13-37-304 (1985); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. 19:44A-27 (West Supp. 1986);
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-159.1 (Supp. 1985); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §
260.005 (1983); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-30-2(a) (Supp. 1985); Utah: UTAH CODE
ANN. § 59-14A-100(1),(2) (1984); Virginia: VA. CODE § 58.1-346 (Supp. 1986); Wisconsin:
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11.50(1), (2) (West Supp. 1986).
Oklahoma lawmakers enacted a public financing law in 1979, but, in an opinion left undis-
turbed by the state supreme court, the Attorney General found that it violated the
Oklahoma Constitution. See Democratic Party v. Estep, 652 P.2d 271 (Okla. 1982).
12. Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.031(0 (1985); Arizona: Auiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-
1059(1) (1985); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2016.5 (1983); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §
260.345(3)-(5) (1983).
13. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 40-18-146(c) (1975); California: CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §
18701 (West Supp. 1986); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2503 (Supp. 1986); Indiana: IND.
CODE ANN. § 9-7-5.5-8(a) (Burns 1985); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.21, .23 (West Supp.
1986); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. § 121.230 (Supp. 1986); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
36, § 5283 (Supp. 1986); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-159.1 (Supp. 1985);
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-30-2(a) (Supp. 1985); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14A-
100(1),(2) (1984); Virginia: VA. CODE § 58.1-346 (Supp. 1986).
14. Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 11-217 (Supp. 1984); Maryland: MD. ELEC. CODE
ANN. § 31-3(a) (1974); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 55A (West Supp. 1986);
Michigan: MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.212 (Supp. 1986); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 10A.30 (West Supp. 1986); Montana: MoNT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-304 (1985); New
Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-27 (West Supp. 1986); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. §
11.50(1), (2) (West Supp. 1986).
15. See supra note 14.
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With the exception of Indiana, which finances candidates from
personalized license tag fees, each state's public financing scheme
is funded through a checkoff provision on state income tax forms.
In five states the checkoff adds to the tax liability of the tax-
payer,"8 and these states have generally had low participation
rates. 1 7 The other states use a checkoff system, similar to that on
federal tax returns, which does not add to the taxes paid.'8
Congress addressed campaign financing reforms in 1974 by sub-
stantially amending the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA). 1" A major component of these reforms was the Presiden-
tial Election Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act)"0 which provided
public funding of presidential campaign activities. The public
funding under the Fund Act applies to general election candidates
and covers the period from the nominating conventions to thirty
days after the general election. FECA regulates campaign financing
and reporting for all federal elections, including presidential
primaries. The provisions of both Acts were reviewed and generally
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1976 in Buckley v.
Valeo.21
B. Florida
Florida joined this reform movement early. Prior to 1973, cam-
paign financing was governed by section 99.161, Florida Statutes.22
In 1973, a comprehensive revision was enacted and codified in
chapter 106, Florida Statutes, but it did not include public financ-
ing. 3 From 1975 through 1980, twenty-five bills proposing some
form of public financing were filed. Fifteen bills sought to create
16. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 40-18-146(b) (1975); California: CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §
17245 (West Supp. 1986); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5283 (Supp. 1986); Massa-
chusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110, § 6c (West Supp. 1986); Virginia: VA. CODE §
58.1-346 (Supp. 1986).
17. COMMON CAUSE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN THE STATES 14 (Aug. 1985).
18. Iowa and Montana offer a combination checkoff and surcharge. Iowa: IOWA CODE
ANN. § 56.21, .23 (West Supp. 1986); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-304 (1985).
19. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1982)).
20. 26 U.S.C. § 9001 (1982)
21. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The decision upheld limits on contributions, struck down limits on
overall spending by a candidate and on personal spending by a candidate, struck down lim-
its on independent spending, and upheld the public financing provisions for presidential
elections.
22. FLA. STAT. § 99.161 (1971).
23. FLA. STAT. ch. 106 (1973). The Act strengthened reporting requirements and provided
more effective enforcement procedures, including the establishment of the Florida Elections
Commission to hear allegations of violations and recommend civil penalties.
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trust funds to finance judicial campaigns; ten others addressed
funding campaigns for various statewide offices, including gover-
nor, the Cabinet, comptroller, and-when it was still an elected
body-the Public Service Commission. 4 With the exception of two
1978 bills,' 5 none of this legislation reached the floor of either
house for debate. No public financing bills were filed between 1981
and 1984. Another judicial trust fund bill was filed in 1985, but it
died without receiving a committee hearing. 6
C. Recent Activity
The renewed interest in public financing in 1986 occurred in
many states and in Congress. Arizona and California experienced
petition drives to place on the ballot initiatives to limit contribu-
tions and spending in political races.27 A bill providing partial pub-
lic funding for state and legislative offices passed the Iowa House
of Representatives, but, despite favorable committee hearings, died
in the Senate. 8 In Missouri, a campaign financing bill passed both
houses but died in conference committee. 29 A public financing bill
for judicial elections passed the Pennsylvania House of Represent-
atives but also needed Senate approval.30 Maryland lawmakers
passed a public financing bill in 1974 but delayed implementation
at least twice and then stopped collecting funds; the state has set a
one-time implementation for 1990 to include only gubernatorial
24. Fla. HB 1404 (1975); Fla. SB 1298 (1975); Fla. HB 3228 (1976); Fla. HB 3382 (1976);
Fla. SB 1260 (1976); Fla. HB 614 (1977); Fla. HB 1703 (1977); Fla. HB 1903 (1977); Fla. HB
2075 (1977); Fla. SB 941 (1977); Fla. HB 382 (1978); Fla. HB 635 (1978); Fla. HB 1052
(1978); Fla. SB 474 (1978); Fla. HB 61 (1979); Fla. HB 464 (1979); Fla. HB 465 (1979); Fla.
HB 887 (1979); Fla. HB 960 (1979); Fla. HB 1470 (1979); Fla. HB 1725 (1979); Fla. SB 608
(1979); Fla. SB 1225 (1979); Fla. HB 1242 (1980); Fla. SB 975 (1980).
25. Fla. HB 1052 (1978) and Fla. SB 474 (1978) each passed its respective house but
died in committee in the opposite chamber. Both bills created judicial trust funds. Their
relative success can be attributed in part to a legislative reaction to the decision in Richman
v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1977), where the Florida Supreme Court held that a similar
system established in 1972 by the Dade County Bar Association violated state law.
26. Sen. Mattox Hair, Dem., Jacksonville, filed Fla. SB 865 (1986), which provided pub-
lic funding only for gubernatorial candidates. The Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee
amended it to apply only to candidates for treasurer. The Committee passed the bill as a
committee substitute, but it died in the Senate Appropriations Committee. FLA. LEGIS., His-
TORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 143, SB 865.
27. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 13 CAMPAIGN PRACTICES REPORTS, No. 4, at 9 (Feb.
24, 1986); CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 13 CAMPAIGN PRACTICES REPORTS, No. 7, at 6
(Apr. 7, 1986).
28. Iowa House File 2377; Iowa House File 2476 (as amended and filed by the Appropri-
ations Committee).
29. Mo. HB 1175 (1986).
30. Pa. HB 1379 (1986).
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candidates."1 Michigan legislators considered legislation to increase
the spending limit for gubernatorial campaign financing to $2 mil-
lion.82 In New York, the Commission on Integrity in Government
issued its first report April 30, 1986, calling for public financing of
various state and municipal offices.33
Both houses of Congress had numerous bills relating to cam-
paign financing filed in 1986. Five of eleven Senate bills and six of
thirteen House bills proposed public financing of campaigns for the
respective chambers.
II. House BILL 1194
The Florida Election Campaign Financing Act is a voluntary
program that provides only partial public financing for qualifying
candidates for statewide office. It came to life after careful exami-
nation by legislative committees and an eleventh-hour resurrection
from what had seemed certain death.
A. The Road to Passage
House Bill 1194 passed the Florida Senate by a twenty-one to
twelve margin at 2:20 a.m. on June 7, 1986, exactly six months af-
ter the Speaker's request to draft the bill." That request came in a
meeting of Speaker Thompson, Representative Joe Allen, 3 Repre-
sentative Mary Figg, 6 and staff. Though the Speaker had publicly
mentioned his interest in financing legislation in November,3 7 he
had not decided to have a bill filed until January,38 and did not
discuss the bill publicly until he announced it at a press conference
on March 26, 1986.3a One month later it passed the House40 rela-
tively unchanged.
31. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 13 CAMPAIGN PRACTICES REPORTS, No. 6, at 6 (Mar.
24, 1986); CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 13 CAMPAIGN PRACTICES REPORTS, No. 7, at 6
(Apr. 7, 1986).
32. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 13 CAMPAIGN PRACTICES REPORTS, No. 7, at 6 (Apr.
7, 1986).
33. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 13 CAMPAIGN PRACTICES REPORTS, No. 11, at 7 (June
2, 1986).
34. FLA. S. JOUR 1167 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1986).
35. Dem., Key West.
36. Dem., Temple Terrace.
37. Speaker advocates public financing, supra note 1.
38. Interview with Speaker Thompson (June 17, 1986) (tape on file, Florida State Uni-
versity Law Review).
39. Speaker: Put limit on election cost, Orlando Sentinel, Mar. 27, 1986, at 3D, col. 3.
40. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 194 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 28, 1986). The vote was 60-to-47. The proposed
bill, PCB EE-1, was heard for the first time in the Elections Subcommittee of the House
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Senate action was also completed in only a month, but it was the
crucial last month of the legislative session. In the waning hours,
passage was far from assured. The Senate companion bill, Senate
Bill 669, had been filed within a week of the Speaker's press con-
ference by Senator Frank Mann,"' but it did not receive a hearing
until after the House bill had been approved by the House.'2 The
Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee heard the bill on May 1, and,
after adopting amendments conforming it to the House bill, added
three more amendments and approved the bill as a committee sub-
stitute. 3 The House bill was taken up by the Senate Judiciary-
Civil Committee on May 21, and summarily approved."' Both bills
were then awaiting hearing in the Senate Appropriations Commit-
tee. On May 27, the Committee held its last scheduled meeting
without taking up either bill. Following Senator Mann's public ac-
cusation that Senate President Harry Johnston 45 had tried to kill
the bill,4' another Committee meeting was scheduled for June 6,
the last day of the session. "I forced [the meeting] so it would not
be an issue in the campaign," Senator Johnston said later.7 The
Appropriations Committee debated the House bill before approv-
ing it eleven to four, and without debate passed the Senate com-
mittee substitute by the same margin.'8
Later that evening, the Senate took up the House bill. Despite
little debate and no amendments, the bill failed by a single vote.' 9
Afterwards, Senator Mann worked the Senate floor, trying to
Committee on Ethics and Elections on April 9, 1986. It was approved the next day by the
full Committee by a vote of 16-to-2 and filed with the Clerk. On April 21, Fla. HB 1194
(1986) was passed as amended by the Appropriations Committee. The bill was heard on the
House floor the next day and the Appropriations Committee amendments were adopted.
Final debate and the vote on passage took place on April 28. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGIS-
LATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 364, HB 1194.
41. Dem., Ft. Myers, 1982-1986.
42. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS at 120, SB 669.
43. Id.
44. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 364, HB 1194.
45. Dem., West Palm Beach, 1974-1986.
46. Campaign money bill faltering, Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, June 5, 1986, at 14A,
col. 4.
47. Finally, Senate to look at Mann's campaign bill, Ft. Myers News-Press, June 6,
1986, at 6B, col. 5. Throughout the session, Sens. Johnston and Mann were rival candidates
for the Democratic nomination for governor.
48. Fla. S. Comm. on Approp., tape recording of proceedings (June 6, 1986) (on file with
committee).
49. The vote was 16-to-15. FLA. S. JouR. 885 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1986).
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gather support for a motion to reconsider while Bill Jones, Execu-
tive Director of Common Cause/Florida, lobbied senators outside
the chamber. As the time for adjournment approached-midnight,
June 6, 1986-these efforts seemed destined to fail. With neither
house able to finish work on other major issues, however, the legis-
lature extended the 1986 Regular Session to 3:00 a.m. The result
was a twenty-one to twelve vote in favor of the Florida Election
Campaign Financing Act."
B. Major Provisions
It is important to emphasize two points about the FECFA. First,
it is a voluntary program. Candidates are free to decide, for any
reason, not to participate and to raise and spend funds without
regard to the FECFA limitations." Such a decision probably would
become an issue in the campaign, and ultimately the voters would
have the opportunity to judge that decision. Second, the FECFA
provides only partial funding for a campaign, matching dollar for
dollar certain contributions from individuals. Other legal sources of
campaign funds are not restricted.5 2
However, there are conditions attached to the receipt of state
funds, in an attempt to control abuse and wasteful, unnecessary, or
excessive spending without creating disincentives to participation
in the program. How successfully the FECFA achieves this objec-
tive can only be learned through its use.
1. Qualifying for Funding
A candidate must make the decision to participate in the
FECFA program at the time of qualifying. The decision to partici-
pate is irrevocable.8 Once the decision to accept public funding is
made, the candidate cannot change his mind, return any public
money he has received, and ignore the spending limitations. A re-
quest for funds includes an agreement to abide by the applicable
campaign spending limits54 and to submit the campaign account to
50. Sen. Larry Plummer, Dem., South Miami, made the motion to reconsider after con-
versations with Rep. Allen, with whom Sen. Plummer shares a constituency. No other votes
changed. The different vote totals primarily reflect the movement of senators in and out of
chamber during the last hours of the session.
51. Ch. 86-276, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.33).
52. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 106.33(2), 35(2)).
53. Id., 1986 Fla. Laws at 2031 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.33).
54. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.33(1)).
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a post-election audit by the Division of Elections. 5 In addition, a
candidate must raise certain funds in a specific manner5 6 Because
qualifying takes place less than two months before the first pri-
mary57 and fundraising normally begins long before that, a candi-
date must make the decision about participating in the program
when he develops his campaign budget and sets a fundraising
strategy.
One of the arguments against public financing legislation is that
it encourages single-issue and fringe candidates to run and take
advantage of state funding. Therefore, public financing programs
include a requirement that candidates demonstrate a minimum
amount of public support-cross a threshold of legitimacy-in or-
der to qualify for public funds. Under the FECFA, candidates
must raise five percent of the applicable spending limit in qualify-
ing matching contributions (QMCs). QMCs are contributions of
$250 or less from individuals made after September 1 of the calen-
dar year prior to the election. 8 Based on spending limits derived
from 1982 election result totals, gubernatorial candidates would
have to raise $100,000-400 contributions of $250-and Cabinet
candidates would have to receive $33,750-135 QMCs. Individual
contributions of more than $250 are n(-- rohibited. Contribution
limits to candidates for statewide office set in section 106.08, Flor-
ida Statutes, are undisturbed by the FECFA,59 but for purposes of
qualifying for matching state money, only the first $250 of any in-
dividual contribution will be considered. 0 This restriction is con-
sistent with other states which have limited matching funds. 1 The
FECFA does not restrict matching to monetary contributions,
55. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.33(3)). The Division has the authority to con-
duct audits and investigations under FLA. STAT. § 106.22(6) (1985). Audits are mandated for
candidates accepting public funds.
56. Ch. 86-276, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.33(2)).
57. After noon of the 50th day prior to the first primary and before noon of the 46th day
prior to the first primary. FLA. STAT. § 99.061(1) (1985).
58. Ch. 86-276, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.33(2)).
59. For statewide offices, the limit for individuals for each election is $3,000. FLA. STAT. §
106.08(1)(c) (1985).
60. Ch. 86-276, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.33(2)).
Though the contribution limit of $3,000 per election (first primary, second primary, general
election) allows an individual to contribute a total of $9,000, the $250 matching limit is a
one-time match for all aggregate contributions and does not apply to each election. Id.
61. Matching limits which have been set are: $250-Massachusetts; $100-Hawaii, Mich-
igan, Wisconsin; $50-Maryland. J. PALMER & E. FEIGENBAUM, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 86
(1986) (chart 4) (periodically published by National Clearinghouse on Elections Admin.,
Federal Elections Comm'n, Washington, D.C.).
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therefore, loans and in-kind contributions are eligible to be
matched up to $250.62
Matching is limited to contributions from individuals,6 3 elimi-
nating matching of contributions from corporations, unions, PAC's
and political parties. This limitation is not to imply anything nega-
tive or sinister about such contributions-though there is a long-
running debate about the influence of "special interest" campaign
contributions-rather, it is an attempt to shift the focus of cam-
paign fundraising and electioneering to the average citizen by pro-
viding encouragement to individuals to get involved in campaigns.
As the bill was presented to the House Subcommittee on Elections,
corporate contributions were matchable. However, when Represen-
tative Mike Abrams6" noted the inequity of allowing corporate con-
tributions to be matched, an amendment to delete corporate
matching was adopted. 5
The provision limiting matching funds to only those contribu-
tions given after September 1 of the calendar year prior to the
election was designed to discourage potential candidates from
campaigning and soliciting contributions more than a year before
the first primary." Because campaign issues are not well-defined
more than a year before an election, the early part of most lengthy
campaigns is used primarily for fundraising. The campaign pur-
pose is twofold: to establish the candidate's political credibility
and to scare off potential opponents. The more expensive a candi-
date expects the campaign to be, the longer the campaign. By cre-
ating a dependable source of funds based on a candidate's own
fundraising, the FECFA is intended to reduce the need for candi-
dates to start early campaigning and fundraising.6 7
62. FLA. STAT. § 106.011(3) (1985) (definition of "contribution").
63. The term "individual" was used instead of the more broadly defined "person." See
FLA. STAT. § 106.011(8) (1985).
64. Dem., Miami.
65. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Ethics & Elect., Subcomm. on Elect., tape recording of proceed-
ings (Apr. 9, 1986) (amendment 1 to PCB EE-1) (on file with committee).
66. In both houses, there was discussion of the deleterious effects of long campaigns,
particularly boredom and voter apathy. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ethics & Elect., tape recording
of proceedings (Apr. 10, 1986) (on file with committee); Fla. S. Comm. on Jud'y-Civ., tape
recording of proceedings (May 1, 1986) (on file with committee).
67. An amendment to Fla. SB 669 (1986) was adopted in the Senate Judiciary-Civil
Committee to prohibit all fundraising more than 12 months before the general election by
candidates seeking public funds. Sen. Curt Kiser, Repub., Palm Harbor, offered the amend-
ment and argued that longer campaigns drive up the cost of elections. Sen. Pat Frank,
Dem., Tampa, suggested a similar limitation for all candidates, but this restriction would be
unconstitutional. In Sadowski v. Shevin, 345 So. 2d 330, 332-33 (Fla. 1977), the Florida
Supreme Court held such a limitation in FLA. STAT. § 106.15(1) (1975) to be a violation of
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2. Spending Limits
A campaign expenditure limit is not essential to a public financ-
ing program,68 but it was considered a critical element in Florida.
Given Speaker Thompson's objective of allowing individuals of av-
erage means to effectively compete for statewide office,"9 providing
funds without setting a limit on spending70 would have been
counterproductive and much more difficult to sell politically. Such
a measure would only add to the treasure chests of well-financed
candidates without creating an equitable situation for all candi-
dates receiving public funds.
The spending limit set by FECFA is a formula tied to the num-
ber of votes cast for that office in the last general election: seventy-
five cents per vote for governor and twenty-five cents per vote for
Cabinet office.7 1 A spending limit dependent on voter turnout or
registration gives an incentive to candidates, political parties, and
others to get voters registered and to turn out the vote, thus pro-
ducing a secondary benefit. Thus, under the FECFA, an increase in
voter turnout will result in a corresponding rise in the spending
limit for the next election.
first amendment free speech rights. The court stated: "'In the free society ordained by our
Constitution it is not the government but the people-individually as citizens and candi-
dates and collectively as associations and political committees-who must retain control
over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign.'" Sadowski,
345 So. 2d at 333 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
68. Three of the eight states which fund candidates directly, see supra note 14, do not
impose a spending limit, but do limit the state funds made available to candidates. See
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55A, §§ 5,7 (West 1985); Montana: MONT.
CODE ANN. § 13-37-304 (1985); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-33 (West 1985).
69. Speaker advocates public financing, supra note 1.
70. Such a "floor without a ceiling" concept was suggested by Moore & LaBelle, supra
note 8, at 863. A quid pro quo could still be required for receiving state funds, such as
foregoing certain special interest money.
71. Ch. 86-276, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.34(1)). In the
event a Cabinet office was not contested in the previous general election, the spending limit
would be tied to the number of votes cast for governor in the last contested gubernatorial
election. Though it is less likely that the gubernatorial race would be uncontested, the
formula in such an event would be based on the number of votes cast in the last contested
gubernatorial general election. Id.
Other states use various techniques or formulas. See, e.g., Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. §
11-208 (1984 Supp.) (limit based on number of registered voters eligible to vote for respec-
tive office); Maryland: MD. ELEc. CODE ANN. art. 33, § 31-3 (1983) (ceiling based on popu-
lation); Michigan: MICH. STAT. ANN. 4.1703 (Callaghan 1985) (cap set without formula);
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.25 (1984) (ceiling based on population); Wisconsin:
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 4.1703 (Callaghan 1985), WIs. STAT. ANN. § 11.31 (West 1985) (cap set
without formula).
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In addition to holding down campaign spending, an expenditure
limit, especially one based on a matching formula, restricts the
amount of state funds which must be committed. Under the
FECFA, no candidate could qualify for state funds of more than
fifty percent of the spending limit. A publicly funded candidate
who has only primary opposition is restricted to sixty percent of
the spending limit which would otherwise apply.72 This limit recog-
nizes the significant startup costs associated with a campaign but
assures that a candidate with only primary opposition will not be
entitled to the same funding as a candidate in the general election.
The Florida formula, tied to the vote totals for the 1982 general
election, yields an expenditure limit of $2,016,425 for gubernatorial
candidates and $672,141 for Cabinet candidates.7" The vote totals
for 1986 and, concomitantly, the spending limits for 1990, are ex-
pected to be higher due to several factors. First, there were no high
interest statewide races in 1982. The power of incumbency yielded
only weak competition for United States Senator Lawton Chiles,
Governor Bob Graham and most Cabinet officers. 74 There was only
a fifty-five percent voter turnout in 1982, 75 a five percent drop
from 1978. The 1986 elections stand in sharp contrast. The cam-
paign for the United States Senate between incumbent Paula
Hawkins, and Governor Graham was spirited. Both major parties
had crowded primaries for governor, and for the first time in years
every Cabinet office was contested in the general election. In addi-
tion, the casino gambling and lottery initiatives were on the state
ballot.
With a vote total for governor and the Cabinet offices of three
million, the 1990 spending limits would be $2,250,000 for guberna-
torial candidates and $750,000 for Cabinet candidates. These limits
would be lower than the anticipated expenditures of many 1986
candidates. Of course, these limits are intended to reduce cam-
72. Ch. 86-276, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.34(2)).
73. Only two Cabinet offices were contested in the 1982 general election, secretary of
state and commissioner of agriculture. The spending caps for these two offices in 1990,
based on 1982 vote totals, would be $647,217 and $644,872, respectively. Statewide vote
totals from the 1982 general election are as follows: governor-2,688,556; secretary of
state-2,588,869; agriculture commissioner-2,579,487. A. MORRIS, FLORIDA HANDBOOK 532,
540, 545 (19th Biennial ed. 1983-1984).
74. Comptroller Gerald Lewis had strong primary opposition but was unopposed in the
general election. Of the two Cabinet offices contested in the general election, the closest race
was for secretary of state in which the incumbent George Firestone outspent his opponent
four-to-one and outpolled him by 300,000 votes- 1,459,084-to-1,129,785. Id. at 540.
75. The 1982 turnout was 2,688,000 of 4,865,000 registered voters. Id. at 532.
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paign spending. As the bills to cap campaign expenditures made
their way through the legislative process, little attention was given
to the gubernatorial spending limit except as it compared with the
Cabinet limits. Representative Peter Dunbar,7 arguing that Cabi-
net officers are coequal members of Florida's board of directors,
and as such deserved to be treated equally for campaign purposes,
offered an amendment in the House Ethics and Elections Commit-
tee to raise the Cabinet limit to seventy-five cents per vote, the
same as the gubernatorial limit." The committee adopted the
amendment after agreeing that if the amendment's cost hurt the
bill's chances for passage, the House Appropriations Committee
could amend or remove it from the bill.78 The provision would
have had a $14.5 million fiscal impact, so the original language was
restored in the Appropriations Committee.7 9
The argument made on behalf of the Dunbar amendment is en-
ticing but ignores historical spending levels for Cabinet offices.
Without limits, only one Cabinet race has ever seen spending
above the level set by the FECFA. 0 Thus, history does not justify
a spending limit of over $2 million for Cabinet candidates.
Conversely, the gubernatorial limit is below the spending levels
of three out of four candidates in the 1978 and 1982 general elec-
tions."' No one attempted to raise that level, and it generated little
discussion. Three factors may have contributed to this. First,
though Speaker Thompson did not comment publicly on the provi-
sions of the bill, his support for the concept may have been per-
ceived as support for its substantive provisions. Second, the mea-
sure was not to become effective until after the 1986 elections, the
76. Repub., Crystal Beach.
77. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ethics & Elect., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 10, 1986)
(on file with committee) (amendment 4 to PCB EE-1),
78. Id.
79. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Approp., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 21, 1986) (on file
with committee) (amendment 4 to HB 1194).
80. Spending in the 1982 Democratic primary for comptroller between incumbent Gerald
Lewis and Rep. Ralph Haben, Dem., Palmetto, 1972-1982, exceeded the limits of the Act.
Haben spent $701,368, and Lewis spent $1,029,872. (Lewis spent another $460,375 after the
primary, though he was unopposed in the general election). Campaign Treasurer's Report,
1982 (on file, Division of Elections). Otherwise the highest spenders on record were unop-
posed Treasurer Bill Gunter, who spent $509,156, and Att'y Gen. Jim Smith, who spent half
of his $425,813 after he defeated his only primary opponent. Id. Gunter and Smith were
expected to be candidates for governor in 1986, and much of their spending has been attrib-
uted to those aspirations.
81. Democrat Bob Graham spent $2.7 million in 1978 and $2.8 million in 1982. Republi-
can Jack Eckerd spent $3.3 million in 1978, and Republican Skip Bafalis spent $1.35 million
in 1982. Id.; Campaign Treasurer's Report, 1978 (on file, Division of Elections).
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turnout for which could set new spending limits. Third, even if the
new limits were too low, the legislature would have four opportuni-
ties to address the issue before the 1990 elections.
3. Distribution of Funds
Unlike states which simultaneously passed campaign disclosure
and public campaign financing laws, Florida already had a compre-
hensive campaign finance reporting system-chapter 106, Florida
Statutes. Chapter 106 provides that a candidate may not collect or
expend money in a campaign for public office unless a campaign
treasurer has been appointed and a primary campaign depository
designated.8 2 Once a treasurer has been appointed and a deposi-
tory established, the candidate and treasurer are responsible for
filing quarterly reports of campaign finance activity. 3 After the
last day of qualifying, reports are due three times before each pri-
mary election, and twice before the general election." A final re-
port is due within ninety days after the termination of candidacy,
whether by withdrawal, defeat, election, or other cause.85 Similar
reporting requirements apply to political committees,8 committees
of continuous existence, 87 political parties, 8 and any person mak-
ing independent expenditures.89
The distribution of state funds under the FECFA is tied to the
reports required under current law. Each report is to be reviewed
by the Division of Elections to verify the amount of funds to be
distributed.90 A candidate must initially request participation in
the program at the time of qualifying, and the Division of Elec-
tions must certify that the candidate is eligible to receive fund-
ing.91 Once certified, a candidate is entitled to receive the initial
disbursement of state matching funds according to the quarterly
reports filed prior to qualifying.9 2
82. FLA. STAT. § 106.021 (1985).
83. Id. § 106.07.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 106.141.
86. Id. §§ 106.03, 07.
87. Id. § 106.04.
88. Id. § 106.29.
89. Id. § 106.07 1.
90. Ch. 86-276, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.35(2)).
91. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.35(1)). The Division of Elections is to adopt
rules providing a procedure for appealing an adverse decision on certification.
92. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.35(3)(a)). The initial disbursement is to occur
within seven days after the close of qualifying, and subsequent disbursements within seven
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Rapid distribution of the matching funds is necessary to en-
courage candidates to participate. The distribution schedule puts
money in the candidate's hands on the twenty-fifth and eleventh
days before an election or earlier if the candidate opts to have the
funds distributed directly to his campaign account by electronic
fund transfer.9 3 In order to facilitate verification and distribution,
the Division of Elections may prescribe separate reporting forms
for statewide candidates."4
To prevent a candidate from receiving the maximum in state
funds (which could be as much as one million dollars for guberna-
torial candidates) without reaching the general election, and to
prevent wasteful spending, the distribution schedule restricts the
disbursement of state funds to candidates with both primary and
general election opposition. For the first primary, up to fifteen per-
cent of the spending limit will be available, and for the second pri-
mary, funding will be provided up to a cumulative total of twenty-
five percent of the spending limit. 5 This allows a candidate at-
tempting to qualify for the maximum amount of state funds to re-
ceive as much as half the available state funds before the second
primary, with the remaining half available for the general election.
If a candidate also accepts nonmatchable contributions, the per-
centage of state money available for distribution during the prima-
ries is actually higher in relation to total state funds disbursed.
This restriction safeguards the Election Campaign Financing Trust
Fund 6 and also yields a formula for determining the maximum
amount of state money necessary to fund the program. 7 Based on
days after the periodic reports required on the 32d and 18th days prior to the first and
second primaries and on the 18th day prior to the general election. Id.
93. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.33).
94. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.35(2)).
95. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.35(3)(b)). In monetary terms, based on the
1982 vote totals, a gubernatorial candidate would be entitled to $302,000 in state funding for
the first primary, and another $202,000 for a total of $504,000, for the second primary. A
Cabinet candidate could receive up to $100,800 for the first primary, and up to $168,000 for
the second primary.
96. Ch. 86-276, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.32).
97. The formula is 1.5 x spending limit + (X-4)(15% of the spending limit) = maxi-
mum state funding. X is the number of candidates running for the office. Under a worst-
case scenario for appropriations purposes, it is assumed that all candidates would accept
only matchable contributions and all would qualify for maximum state funding. The
formula is derived from the following step-by-step analysis: (1) Only the two general elec-
tion candidates can qualify for the maximum amount of matching state funds: 50% of the
spending limit x 2 = SL. (2) Two candidates in each party can qualify for the second pri-
mary funding level of 25% of the spending limit, but since one in each party goes on to the
general election and additional funding, this leaves only two candidates at the second pri-
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that formula, estimated appropriations of $12 million over a four-
year period would be necessary to fully fund the program." This
assumes all candidates will accept only matchable contribu-
tions-an unlikely situation. A more realistic estimate of the ap-
propriations necessary to satisfy candidate requests in 1990 would
be $5 million to $6 million.
4. Funding
Florida and Indiana are now the only states not utilizing a
checkoff on income tax forms as the principal funding mechanism
for public financing programs."s Florida, however, is unique in
funding the program from general revenue funds. 00 In those states
which do not employ a surcharge or add-on provision, the tax mon-
ies voluntarily committed to campaign financing reduce the pool of
general revenue dollars otherwise available. The distinction in
Florida is that the legislature makes the funding decision, rather
than individual citizens.
mary funding level: 2 x 25% of the spending limit = .5 SL. (3) All the other candidates (X-
4) will be eliminated after the first primary, and will have been funded at this amount: (X-
4)(15% of the spending limit) = ? (4) Any independent or minor party candidates who
qualify for the general election are entitled to match and receive up to 50% of the spending
limit in state funds; this amount is in addition to the amount otherwise determined under
the formula. See generally ch. 86-276, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§
106.30-.36).
98. This funding requirement was reached by making the following assumptions: 10 can-
didates for governor, with at least 3 in each party, and requiring a second primary for each
party; 6 candidates for each Cabinet office, 3 in each party, requiring a second primary in
each party.
Another funding requirement analysis was made based on the number of declared candi-
dates as of March 1, 1986: seven Republicans, six Democrats, and one independent for gov-
ernor; two Democrats and one Republican for secretary of state; one Democrat and one
Republican for treasurer; three Democrats and two Republicans for attorney general; five
Republicans and five Democrats for commissioner of education; one Democrat each for
comptroller and commissioner of agriculture. This yielded a need for $10.8 million.
99. Indiana funds its program from a portioli of personalized license tag fees. IND. CODE
§ 9-7-5.5-1 to 10 (Supp. 1986).
100. Originally, Speaker Thompson contemplated a specific funding source other than
general revenue, but then realized that targeting a source would probably generate addi-
tional opposition to the bill, and if the bill failed to pass, the targeted funding source could
then be otherwise used. He also believes government-in particular, state government in
Florida-ought to maintain as large a general revenue pool as possible, and let all the vary-
ing services of state government compete for their portion of it. Targeting would have con-
tradicted this rule of thumb. "We stayed pretty pure with it by going this route. Let it
compete! If the public, through its policymakers, thinks it's a worthwhile program, then it
will continue." Interview with Speaker Thompson (June 17, 1986) (tape on file, Florida
State University Law Review).
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The FECFA requires the legislature to appropriate monies to
the trust fund each year that a general election for the affected
offices is held. 1 ' Facing a potential fiscal impact of over $10 mil-
lion in a general election year, the legislature has the option of eas-
ing the impact by appropriating smaller amounts more often, per-
haps annually. In fact, the legislature appropriated $3 million to
the trust fund for fiscal year 1986-87.102
The FECFA provided two other secondary funding sources for
the trust fund. Fines levied by the Elections Commission, which*
would otherwise be deposited into the General Revenue Fund, are
to be deposited into the trust fund.0 ' Also, all surplus campaign
funds, including nonpublic funds, of a candidate who has received
public funding are to be returned for deposit into the trust fund. 10 4
These sources are not expected to generate substantial amounts.
III. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
The FECFA will require close monitoring of election campaigns.
Moreover, several aspects of the legislation may need to be re-
viewed after the public financing system has been tried.
A. Independent Expenditures
When the United States Supreme Court ruled in Buckley v.
Valeo'05 that candidates' expenditures could not be limited, some
groups viewed the decision as an invitation to increase indepen-
dent spending in presidential elections, despite the $1,000 limit
placed on such spending by federal law.106 In Federal Elections
Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Commit-
tee,0 7 the Supreme Court declared the $1,000 limitation unconsti-
tutional, thus throwing open the doors to virtually unlimited inde-
pendent spending in presidential elections. That decision has
caused some advocates of public financing to reconsider their
position. 08
101. Ch. 86-276, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.32).
102. Ch. 86-167, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 1062 (line item 1634A).
103. Ch. 86-276, § 4, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030, 2032 (amending FLA. STAT. § 106.265(3),(4)
(1985)).
104. Id. § 2, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030, 2032 (amending FLA. STAT. § 106.141(7) (1985)).
105. 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
106. 26 U.S.C §§ 9001, 9012(f) (1982).
107. 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
108. See Moore & La Belle, supra note 8, at 879.
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Among those reconsidering support for public financing is for-
mer Representative Tom Moore,109 who suggests focusing on the
definition of "independent expenditure" and the question of who
must assume the burden of proving lack of control or coordination
or consultation with a candidate. Moore's approach is to shift the
burden of proof in two instances to the person or committee mak-
ing the alleged independent expenditure: when the person or com-
mittee has "actively campaigned" for a candidate, and when the
person or committee has made a direct contribution to a candidate,
which, when added to the amount of the independent expenditure,
exceeds the direct contribution limit."10 Either situation would cre-
ate a rebuttable presumption that the expenditure was not inde-
pendent and require the contributor to prove independence. Sena-
tor Joe Gersten"' offered an amendment proposing this concept
during consideration of Senate Bill 669 by the Senate Judiciary-
Civil Committee.1 2 Although the amendment was adopted by the
Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee, it was not added to House Bill
1194 nor contained in the FECFA as passed by the legislature.
Independent spending by PACs and individuals has become sig-
nificant at the federal level, especially in presidential elections,
where they can evade spending limits imposed on candidates ac-
cepting public funding." 3 Although a similar situation could de-
109. Dem., Clearwater, 1974-1978.
110. Moore & La Belle, supra note 8, at 884-90. The authors use the generic term "indi-
rect expenditure" as opposed to the statutory term "independent expenditure," and define
the former to include the latter. They lament that Florida law only regulates independent
expenditures which by definition are "not controlled by, coordinated with, or made upon
consultation with, any candidate, political committee, or agent of such candidate or commit-
tee." FLA. STAT. § 106.011(5) (1985). Further, there is a "perceived need for regulation and
control of all indirect expenditures, especially coordinated ones." Moore & LaBelle, supra
note 8, at 890 (footnote omitted).
The problem with this analysis is that it calls for the regulation of that which is illegal.
FLA. STAT. § 106.021(3) (1985) prohibits any expenditure, except an independent expendi-
ture, from being made "directly or indirectly . . . except through the duly appointed cam-
paign treasurer of the candidate or political committee."
111. Dem., South Miami, 1981-1986.
112. Fla. S. Comm. on Jud'y-Civ., tape recording of proceedings (May 1, 1986) (on file
with committee) (amendment A to SB 669).
113. According to the Federal Elections Commission, independent spending in the 1984




Telephone interview with Karen Finucan, Public Affairs Assistant, Federal Elections Com-
mission, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 2, 1986).
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velop at the state level, there is no evidence to indicate that inde-
pendent spending is threatening the efficacy of state campaign
financing programs. Although Florida has had no spending cap, the
state limits the amount anyone may contribute to a candidate in a
statewide election to $3,000 per election. 1 " Yet, in 1982 there were
no reported independent expenditures on behalf of statewide can-
didates. Moore believes that the amendment on independent con-
tributions is a critical provision for a public financing program. Al-
though it is an area the legislature should watch closely, an
amendment may not be as critical as he believes.'15
B. Funding Source
By using general revenue appropriations, the FECFA risks
charges that it creates a mandatory tax to fund political cam-
paigns. Of course, FECFA is no more mandatory than any other
program funded from the discretionary pool of general revenue
dollars. Though there are other funding alternatives only one was
mentioned during debate-the removal of the sales tax exemption
on advertising."' Removing the sales tax exemption on advertising
would generate almost $52 million annually." 7 This is obviously
much more than is needed to fund FECFA."8
Under another measure enacted by the legislature in 1986,119
most of the sales tax exemptions will be repealed July 1, 1987, un-
less they are reinstated by the legislature. That process may yield
additional sources for general, revenue or the legislature could
114. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(l)(c) (1985).
115. Fla. S. Comm. on Jud'y-Civ., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 1, 1986) (on file
with committee)
116. Fla. S. Comm. on Approp., tape recording of proceedings (June 6, 1986) (on file
with committee).







Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fin. & Tax., HB 1307 (1986) Staff Analysis (n.d.).
118. Although there was no serious effort to expand the program to include legislative
and judicial races, there were suggestions that those races could be included in the future if
public funding is successful. No estimates have been made of the cost of such an expansion,
but it would certainly be less than the $200 million which the sales tax on advertising would
generate over a four-year period.
119. Ch. 86-166, 1986 Fla. Laws 816.
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earmark some of that revenue for the Election Campaign Financ-
ing Trust Fund. Ultimately, whether any specific source is
earmarked will depend largely on how popular public financing
proves with candidates and the public in 1990.
C. Spending Limits
Spending limits must be set at a level which will maintain an
incentive for candidates to participate in public financing-high
enough to allow a candidate to conduct a credible and effective
campaign. The cost of campaigning probably will continue to in-
crease; even with a cost of living adjustment as a feature of the
FECFA,12 0 spending limits could fall to an unreasonable level.
Without periodic adjustment, the spending limits could become so
unrealistic that the FECFA would be ignored by candidates. To
ensure the viability of the FECFA, the spending limits should be
reviewed before each general election approaches.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FECFA was the Florida Legislature's first real effort in over
six years to address public financing of elections. It was premised
on the perception that persons of average economic means, even
with a reasonable amount of political support, cannot afford to run
for statewide office. If this perception is accurate, only individuals
of great personal wealth or those sponsored by large special inter-
est contributors may attain the highest levels of state policymak-
ing. This prospect would create doubt with the general public that
the best interests of the state are being served.
The FECFA is a modest proposal, providing only partial funding
of statewide campaigns, at the option of the candidate, with a limit
on total campaign spending. It places Florida in the growing num-
ber of jurisdictions offering public funds to candidates for public
office. Florida, however, is the only state using general revenue to
fund the program. The FECFA attempts to offer enough incentive
to be practical and popular but to provide enough controls to be
prudent.
Senator Mann began his presentation to the Senate Judiciary-
Civil Committee in support of the FECFA with a quote from Abra-
ham Lincoln, "If destruction be our lot, it will surely come from
120. Ch. 86-276, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 2030 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 106.34(3)).
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within."'' Another Republican, Senator Barry Goldwater, might
agree. He was quoted as having characterized the current state of
campaigning as "a crisis of liberty."'22
Unlimited campaign spending eats at the heart of the democratic
process. It feeds the growth of special interest groups created
solely to channel money into political campaigns. It creates an
impression that every candidate is bought and owned by the big-
gest givers. And it causes elected officials to devote more time to
raising money than to their public duties. 23
The Florida Legislature has addressed this crisis; the success of the
new legislation will be determined in future elections.
121. Fla. S. Comm. on Jud'y-Civ., tape recording of proceedings (May 1, 1986) (on file
with committee).
122. U.S. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 49 (remarks of Fred Wertheimer).
123. Id. (quoting Sen. Goldwater).
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